Management Control Optimization under Managerial Overconfidence: A Principal–Agent Model of Business Development Decisions

Yu-Min Wei

doi:10.55578/jdso.2611.012

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Home > Volumes and issues > Management Control Optimization under Managerial Overconfidence: A Principal–Agent Model of Business Development Decisions

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Research Article 13 November 2026

Management Control Optimization under Managerial Overconfidence: A Principal–Agent Model of Business Development Decisions

Yu-Min Wei ¹

weiyumin.research@gmail.com

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1 : Independent Researcher, Puli 545301, Nantou, Taiwan, Province of China

DOI: 10.55578/jdso.2611.012

Keywords: Management control optimization, Managerial overconfidence, Business development decisions, Incentive intensity, Monitoring intensity

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